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FRIDAY v. STATE BAR

[23 C.2d

we believe that holding should be limited to the bare proposition that the court has such power, but that it will not be exercised except possibly in rare or unusual cases. [5b] But even
conceding that the re-examination of a disbarred attorney may
be required in proper cases, no such requirement should be invoked in cases of mere suspension of an attorney from practice,
as a suspended attorney is still a member of the bar, but his
right to practice is suspended for a limited period. When
such period expires he may resume practice without obtaining
an order of this c,ourt or other authorization permitting him
to do so.
In view of the conclusion herein reached, it is not necessary
to review the claim that petitioner's conduct indicates a lack
of the requisite mental qualifications. Suffice it to observe
that his conduct during the hearing before the local administrative committee was far from commendable. It approached,
if not reached, an attitude of contempt. It was rude and unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. While petitioner's written presentation of his case and his correspondence are barely comprehensible at times, it may well arise
from an unusual or odd sense of humor, "wise-cracking," and
extreme facetiousness, rather than a lack of knowledge of the
law.
Petitioner is suspended from the practice of law for six
months, this order to become effective thirty days from the
iiling of this decision.
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
Traynor,J., concurred in the jUdgment.
GIBSON, C. J.-I concur in the conclusion that petitioner
should be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of six months, based on evidence showing solicitation of business. I also concur in the conclusion that it is improper to
require that petitioner's suspension be continued beyond
such six months' period and until such time as he shall have
taken and passed the examination given to attorneys from
other states seeking admission to practice here. Although
an attorney may not practice law while suspended, the statute does not require that his name be stricken from the roll
of attorneys. (State Bar Act, sec. 6117.) He at all times re:
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Edmonds, J., concurred.

[So F. No. 16724. In Bank. Dec. 27. 1943.]
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a transcript because of disability of the reporter, is addressed
to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its action in
that regard will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse
of discretion is clearly shown.
[3]

l4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

ld.-Record-Alternative Method-Time for Preparation and
Filing-Effect of Delay.-It is the duty of an appellant to
take all necessary steps to insure the prompt filing of a transcript by the reporter, and it is not sufficient to file a notice
of appeal, request a transcript and arrange for compensating
the reporter. If the appellant is not sufficiently diligent in
this regard, the trial Court may not only deny a motion for
new trial under Code Civ. Proc., § 953e, but may terminate
the proceedings for preparation of the transcript.

ld.-Record-Alternative Method-Time for Preparation and
Filing-Evidence of Undue DelaY.-The evidence sustained the
trial court's holding that there was undue delay in the preparation of a transcript and t:lat appellant had not exercised the required diligence to guard against the reporter's inability to
complete the transcript, where, before the reporter became
engaged in another case and during a three months' recess in
that case, other competent reporters were available; where
appellant took no activl;! steps by writ of mandate or otherwise to compel completion of the transcript; and where his
motion for a new trial under Code Civ. Proc., § 953e, was filed
almost sixteen months after his notice of appeal' and over
eight months after the reporter became permanently disabled.

ld.-Record-Alternative Method-Preparation_Disability of
Reporter-New Trial.-The fact that the reporter's transcriber had obtained orders extending the time to prepare the
transcript, and so advised appellant's attorney, could not
avail the appellant on his motion for a new trial under Code
Civ. Pro c., § 953e, where he had notice through his attorney
that the orders were void; where there was no attempt to
obtain relief under Code Civ. Pro c., § 473, and the time limited
by that section had expired before appellant made any application to the court; where appellant did not rely upon any
order, as neither party saw the orders until the time of appellant's motion, and where for a considerable time there wero
no orders in effect.

ld.-Record-Alternative Method-Time for Preparation and
Filing-Effect of DelaY.-There was no abuse of discretion by
the trial court in denying a motion for new trial, when the
appellant, by taking the necessary steps for the prompt filing
of the transcript, could have avoided the contingency that
made its preparation impossible.
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pleting the transcript. His death thereafter made the preparation of a transcript impossible. (See lVynecoop v. 8ttperior Court, 17 Ca1.2d 657 [Ill P.2d 332].)
[2] Appellant's motion for new trial was made pursuant
to section 953e of the Code of Civil Procedure and was based
upon the impossibility of obtaining a transcript because of
the disability of the reporter. It is settled that the trial
court has a wide discretion in passing on a motion for ne""
trial under section 953e and that its action thereon must
not be disturbed unless it is clearly shown that the trial court
abused this discretion. (Smith v. Orange Belt Supply Co.,
58 Cal.App.2d 848 [137 P,2d 845] ; Moore v. Specialty Oil
Tool Co., 128 Cal.App. 662 [18 P.2d 82]; Conlin v. Coyne,
19 Cal.App.2d 78 [64 P.2d 1123] ; Kroeker v. .Jack, 51 Cal.
App.2d 272 [124 P.2d 619] ; see Camey v. Camey, 8 Ca1.2d
453 [66 P.2d 148].)
[~] It is not sufficient, as appellant contends, to file a
notIce of appeal, request a transcript and arrange for compensating the reporter. It is the duty of the appellant to
take all necessary steps to insure the prompt filing of a tran.
script by the reporter. Ii he is 110t sufficiently diligent in
this regard the trial court may not only deny a motion for
new trial under section 953e of the Code of Civil Procedure
(Smith v. Orange Belt S1tpply Co., supra; Moore v. Specialty
Oil Tool Co., S1tpra; Conlin v. Coyne, supra; Kroeker v. Jack,
supra; sec Comey v. Comey, supra) but may terminate the
proceedings for preparation of the transcript. (Wood v.
Peterson Farms Co., 131 Cal.App. 312 [21 P.2d 468] ; O'Banion v. California C. P. Growers, 109 Cal.App. 328 [292 P.
975] ; Smith v. Jaccard, 20 Cal.App. 280 [128 P. 1023, 1026] ;
Davis v. Alioto, 122 Cal.App. 740 [10 P.2d 467] ; Sheriffs v.
Scott, 109 Cal.App. 438 [292 P. 1088]; Olemmens v. Clemmens, 13 Cal.App.2d 651 [57 P.2d 529] ; Shutz v. Western
etc. Distributors, 24 Cal.App.2d 659 [76 P.2d 135] ; Western
Concrete Pipe Co. v. Grabovich, 118 Cal.App. 367 [5 P.2d
71]; Taft v. Security First Nat. Bank, 139 Cal.App. 228
[33 P.2d 683]; Harris v. Burt, 47 Cal.App. 480 [190 P.
1058].) [4] There is ample evidence in the present case to
~upport the tria.l court's holding that there was undue delay
m the preparatIOn of the transcript and that appellant did
not exercise the diligence required to guard against the contingency that the reporter would be unable to complete the
transcript.
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There was no evidence of disability that would have
prevented the reporter's preparing the transcript between
February 16, 1940, when the appellant filed notice Qf appeal
and request for transcript, and September 15, 1940, when
the reporter suffered a heart attack. Appellant seeks to justify the delay on the ground that the reporter was engaged
in reporting the case of Pacific States' Savings' & Loan
Assn. v. Evans and did not have an opportunity to prepare
the transcript in the present case. There is no evidence that "
the reporter could not have prepared the transcript, between ,
the date appellant filed his request therefor and the date:
on which the reporter commenced reporting the Pacific States
case. Furthermore, it appears that there were other competent court reporters available at the time, but it is not'shown
that appellant or his attorney requested the reporter to get
another reporter to take his place in the Pacific States' case: '
Moreover, despite this engagement, the reporter had an opportunity to prepare the transcript, for there was a recess'
in the Pacific States case from April' 11, 1940, until July
16, 1940, and there is no evidence to show why he did not
prepare it during that period. In any event it is not
a valid excuse that the reporter did not have the time, owing
t.o the press of other bu.siness, to prepare the transcript.
(O'Banion v. California C. P. Growers, 109 Cal.App. 328,
829 [292 P. 975]; see La1tmann v. Conner, 12' Cal.App.2d
631 [55 P.2d 1225].) As pointed out in Harris v. Burt,
47 Cal.App. 480, 482 [190 P. 1058], appellant could
have procured the filing of' the transcript by making a demand on the reporter to complete it and by securing an order
of court or petitioning for writ of mandate to compel him to
do so. Appellant did not at any time call the attention of the
court to the delay, nor did he take any action to persuade"
or compel the reporter to prepare the transcript. Instead,
he let the matter drift until the reporter became unable to do
so. Finally, after the reporter became permanently disabled
there was an unexplained delay of over eight months before
appellant served and filed his notice of intention to move
for a new trial under the provisions of section 953e of the'
Code of Civil Procedure. Appellant's claim of diligence rests
principally upon the fact that his attorney communicated
with the reporter's transcriber. What authority the latter
had does not appear, but in any event, the appellant, after
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learning from these communications of the reporter's inactivity, did nothing to expedite its preparation.
[5] Appellant relies upon the advice given his attorney
by the reporter's transcriber that orders extending the time
to prepare the transcript had been obtained and all necessary
orders further extending time would be obtained by the reporter and the transcriber. From March 7, 1940, when the
transcript was due, until June 25, 1941, the reporter's transcriber procured orders from various superior court judges
extending the time for the reporter to prepare and file the
transcript. Each of these orders was obtained in violation of
section 953a of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing that
"The stenographic reporter shall not postpone the filing of
the transcript except upon order of the court, upon affidavits
filed with the court by the reporter, stating facts' and not
conclusions, which affidavits before any continuance is granted
shall be served upon the attorneys appearing in said cause_
... " No affidavits were ever made, served, or filed, and no
notice was ever served on or mailed to respondents or their
attorneys. There were, moreover, several periods of time,
varying from two or three days to one hundred and twentyseven days, during which there was no protecting order.
Appellant was put on notice that such orders were obtained
in violation of section 953a, for his attorney was told that
orders were being obtained, but never received any affidavits
that are a condition to such orders. Under these circumstances appellant cannot rely on the derelictions of court officers. (See 4 C.J.S. 1374.)
Appellant contends that he had the right to rely upon
void orders extending the reporter's time, citing Oalifornia
Nat. Bank v. El Dorado Lime etc. 00., 200 Cal. 452 [253 P.
704] and Lewith v. Rehmke, 217 Cal. 563 [20 P.2d 687],
which involved bills of exceptions and relief under section
473 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the present case
there was not only no attempt to obtain relief under section
473 but the time limited by that section expired long before
appellant made any application to the court. Moreover, appellant did not rely on any order, for neither party saw the
orders until about the date of appellant's motion, and for
a considerable part of the time there were no orders, valid
or invalid, in effect. [6] Even if the showing made were suffi.
cient to justify an order denying a motion to terminate pro-

ceedings, had the reporter been able to comple~e the. transcript, it is not sufficient to show an a~use of dlscretlon by
the court in denying a motion for new trlal. Every presu~p
tion favors the fairness and regularity of the proceedm.gs
of the trial court leading to the judgment and to the demal
of the motion for new trial. There is certainly no abuse of
discretion by a trial court in refusing to depri,:e the respondent of his judgment when the appellant by ta~mg the necessary steps for the prompt filing of th~ transcrIpt ?oul~ have
avoided the contingency that makes Its preparatIOn Impossible.
.
h
[7] Appellant's contention that the tri.al court m t e
basic action erred in construing and applymg to :h.e. facts
of the case the provisions of section 2344 of the CIVIl Code
was not made on the hearing of his motion in the trial court.
The affidavit in support of the motion declared that "The
legal questions to be determined on. appeal ~ep.end wholly
upon the facts established at the trIal, and It IS therefore
necessary that the reporter's transcript of the trial be . had."
There was no showinO' made as to the nature of the testImony,
and no indication that there was any merit in an appeal.
In the absence of a record showing that section 2344 of the
Civil Code was involved on the trial any discussion of that
section is inappropriate. (See Town of St. Helena v. Merriam, 171 Cal. 135, 137 [152 P. 299].)
[8] Appellant contends that since respondents filed a
cross-appeal they were as responsible as appellant for the
delays in the preparation of the transcript. Appellant, however, was the moving party in the tri~l court on the prese~t
appeal. His failure to take the proper steps to perfect ~lS
appeal in the basic action is in no way excused by the fa~l
ure of respondents to take proper steps to protect theIr
appeal when they are not seeking relief. Each party must
act with diligence to perfect his own appeal. (Dorey v.
Brodis, 153 Cal. 673, 675 [96. P. 278].)
The order appealed from is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., and E~monds, J., concurred.
,
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The question, as the majority opinion states, is whether
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant appel-
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Jant a new trial nnder section 953e of the Code of Civil Procedure upon the ground that the death of the reporter made
it impossible to seeure a reporter's transcript. In concluding
that the record fails to show an abuse of discretion, the majority have, in my opinion, countenanced a procedure and application of the statute which render it meaningless and
ineffective.
In ,January, 1936, in the course of liquidation of Union
Indemnity Company, an insolvent ,Louisiana corporation, this
action was instituted by the Insurance Commissioner, of this
state to recover certain sums for the company from its agent,
defendant Edward Brown and Sons, a corporation, and the
members of that firm. The defendants answered and also
cross-complained, alleging a number of claims for amounts
due them from the company. In October, 1938,' the cause
came to trial on issues joined by amended pleadings, the
court b! stipulation sitting without a jury. On November 25,
1939, Judgment was entered decreeing that plaintiff take
nothing, but that defendants recover $39,267.31 on their crosscomplaint. On January 29, 1940, a motion for new trial was
denied, but the order of denial contained a provision disallowing a $15,000 item to defendants. The findings and conclusions were modified accordingly, and the judgment in favor
of defendants was thus reduced to $24,267.31.
'
O~ February 16, 1940, plaintiff filed notice of appeal from
the Judgment as modified, and a request for a transcript. On
the following day, February 17th, defendants filed notice of
~ppeal.from every part of the judgment adverse to them deny~ng rehef. pray~d for ~y their cross-complaint and disallowing
Items claImed, IncludIng the $15,000 item which was stricken
from the judgment at the time of ruling on the motion for
new trial.
On June 11, 1941, plaintiff gave notice of a motion for an
order setting aside the judgment and granting a new trial
on the ground, among others, that owing to the illness of the
court ~eporter it wo~ld be impossible to get a reporter's
tra~scrIpt. An affidavIt of counsel filed in support of the
motion ave~s that the following efforts were made to procure
the tra~scrIpt: That at the time of filing the request for a
transcrIpt, counsel personally arranged with the official court
reporter, who reported the trial. and with his transcriber for
their compensation. In March, 1940, at the request of' the
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transcriber, counsel went to the city hall and i,dentified .the
papers which were to be included in the clerk s transcrIpt.
She was advised by the transcriber that the reporter w:as reporting the trial of Pacific States Savings & Loa~ SOCM~Y v.
Evans and would be unable to prepare the transcrIpt untIl he
finished that work. She was further advised by the transcriber that orders extending the time of the reporter for preparing the transcript had been obtained, and that all nece~.
sary orders would be taken care of by the reporter or hIS
assistants.
.
Counsel further avers: "Each month thereafter and untIl
October, 1940, I communicated with [the transcri?er] and ~as
told by her that [the reporter] was still engaged In the PaCIfic
States case and that court orders extending his time to file the
transcript had been obta.ined and f i l e d . " .
In October, 1940, affiant was advised by the transcrIber that
the reporter had suffered a severe heart attack on September
14th and was confined to the hospital and that ,she was protecting the time for filing the transcript by order~ of court.
From time to .time thereafter affiant was adVIsed that the
reporter was still in the hospital and was unable to carry on
any work or even read his mail. In February, 194~, she w~s
advised by the transcriber that the reporter was stIll very ill
and that it might be some time before he could return to work;
also that the required court orders were being obtained...
In April, 1941, the transcriber telephoned affiant, adVISIng
her that because of the reporter's ill health he worn,d be unable to complete the transcript. Affiant relayed this infor~
mati on to opposing counsel by telephone and asked them to
arrange with her as to the course to pursue. Thereafter, they
did not communicate with her, so in May she telephoned the
transcriber; She was advised that the'reporter would never
be able to complete the transcript and she later learned that
he had passed away.
. ' .
Meanwhile, and on June 5th, she agaIn telephoned OPPOSIng
counsel and asked them for a stipulation for a new trial. TIICY
promised to let her know. However, she learned that the judge
who tried the case was coming to town, and so, on June 11th
she gave notice of motion to vacate the judgment a~~ for a
new trial pursuant to section 953e of the Code of CIvIl Procedure.
.
..
Her afIidavit ill support of the motion showed, III addItion
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to the averments already mentioned, that there had been
procured through the office of the reporter more than fifteen
different court orders extending his time, two of which purported to be retroactive, so that the period of delay was substantially covered by protective orders. However, the orders
were defective. No affidavits were served or filed in conformity with the requirement of section 953a of the Code of Civil
Procedure that "The stenographic reporter shall not postpone the filing of the transcript except upon order of the
court, upon affidavits filed with the court by the reporter,
stating facts and not conclusions, which affidavits before any
continuance is granted shall be served upon the attorneys
appearing in said cause ... unless the court shall otherwise
order, prior to the making of said order of continuance."
On June 11, 1941, defendants gave notice of motion to terminate proceedings for the preparation of a transcript on
appeal on the ground of unreasonable delay of plaintiff in
procuring a transcript, lack of diligence, and failure of the
reporter to serve and file affidavits to support the orders extending time. This notice was supported by an affidavit of
defendants' counsel pointing to the expense and inconvenience of a retrial, the prejudicial effect of the delay, and the
likelihood that the personal recollections of witnesses would
be less distinct with passing time.
Upon a full hearing of plaintiff's motion to vacate the
judgment and for a new trial, and defendants' motion to
terminate proceedings, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion and granted that of defendants, giving as his reason that
although there is no limit on the time within which a reporter
may prepare a transcript, nevertheless undue delay may be
grounds for refusal to grant a new trial, and that here plaintiff showed a lack of diligence and failed to take proper steps
to guard against the contingency which happened, the inability of the reporter to complete the transcript. Plaintiff
appealed from this ruling.
In this state the jurisdiction of the court to grant a new
trial is limited strictly to the statutory grounds, and as prior
to 1931 there was no statute dealing with the effect of death
or incapacity of the reporter, a new trial could not be had on
that ground. This is contrary to the rule in many jurisdictions where, on death of the reporter, a new trial is granted
as a matter of course, or of right. (Diamond v. Superior
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Oourt (1922), 189 Cal. 732 {210 P. 36], and authorities there
L Rev
A.L.R.
.
d . 25 Cal.
reVlewe
. .114'
, 107 A.L.R. 603; 16
. 683
{a
.1158. 13' A.L.R. 102; People v. Keefe, 254 App.Dlv.
.
2d 473] . Navarro v. State, 141 Tex.Or. 196 [147 S.W.
N .Y.S'.
(T C' A
2d 1081] ; ,
Pac. GreyhO't~nd v. Burgers
ex. IV. pp. ) , 118
S.W.2d 1100; State v. District Ot., 107 Mont. 30 [79 P.2d
665] ; 39 Am.Jur., p. 199, sees. 201-2.)
. .,
I 1931 section 953e was added to the Code of CIVIl Proced~re (Stats. 1931, p. 410). It provi~ed: "When it sh~l
be impossible to have the phonographIC repo:t of the tx: al
transcribed by a stenographic reporter as provld~d b!. sectIOn
953a of this code because of the death or other dIsabIlIty of a
reporter who participated as a stenographic reporter at the
trial the court or a judge thereof shall have power to ~et
l:ISid; and vacate the judgment, order or decree from Whl~h
un appeal has been or is to be taken and to order a new trIal
d' . "

of I~et~t~~~t o:a~:~~~st~~~g this statute, its provisions and
particularly the phrase" shall have powe~," were ?eclared to
be not mandatory but merely to repose I.n the trIal.court a
"wide discretion" in the matter of grantlllg or denylllg new
trials on the stated ground (Moore v. SpeciaUy Oil Tool 00.,
128 Cal.App. 662, 664-5 [18 P.2d 82] ). See to the same effect
Oonlin v. Coyne, 19 Cal. App. 2d 78 [64 P.2d 1123] ; Comey
v. Comey, 8 Ca1.2d 453 [66 P.2d 148] ; Kroeker v. Jack, 51
Cal.App.2d 272 [124 P.2d 619] ; Smith v. Orange Belt Supply
Co., 58 Cal.App.2d 848 [137 P.2d 845].
.'
This construction of the statutory lan~age IS obVIom:ly
a sound one, for to put an absolute compuls~on upon the trIal
court to grant a new trial on a mere ShOWlllg tha~ death or
· b'l't
f the reporter has made the preparatIOn
dIsallYO
. , t'of the
.
transcript impossible, would be to work a gross lllJUS .lee lD
many cases. Every presumption is in favor. of t~e faIrne~,
impartiality, and regularity of the ?roceed~ngs lD th~ trIal
court leading to judgment. A verdIct or Judgment IS presumptively right until it is shown to be ,,:rong. Thus ~o ~e
prive a party of his judgment and t~e lD.tend~en~ lD Its
support, and to force him to r~-establ~sh hIS ~lalm lD every
case where there is a mere ShOWlllg of lDcapaclty or death of
the reporter, without any consideration of the fact~, o~ ~he
diligence or lack of diligence shown by the appellant ~n. ~ldlDg
the timely procurement of a transcript, of the pOSSIbilIty of
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agreeing on a bill of exceptions or statement of facts, or of
the indications of merit or lack of merit in the appeal, would
be just as unfair as to automatically deny a new trial to every
appellant who has' been deprived of his appeal because of the
impossibility of securing a record. (Diamond v. Superior
COtwt, snpra J' Alley v. McCabe, 147 Ill. 410 [35 N.E. 615] ;
Stenographer Cases, 100 Me. 271 [61 A. 782].) A showing of
the death of material witnesRes or other exceptional eircumstances making it impossible for the prevailing party to prove
his case on a re-trial might be considered by a trial judge, in
the exercise of a sound discretion, to overbalance the hard.<;hip
worked on the appellant by deprivation of his appeal on a
full record. In some cases denial of relief by way of a new
trial has properly been grounded upon a showing that appellant himself obstructed the timely preparation of the transcript. In others an appeal on the judgment roll or upon a bill
of exceptions has been found to afford sufficient relief.
But aside from these exceptional cases there will be found
a vast number in the ordinary run where the deprivation of
an appeal on a full transcript without fault on the part of
appellant, but by reason of death or incapacity of the reporter,
and the denial of reliClf by way of a new trial, will work a
hardship and injustice too great to be countenanced; cases
where the su('cess or failure of the appeal depends wholly
upon a complete presentation of the facts established at the
trial; cases where the re-trial may be had without material
damage by delay to the rights of the respondent; and cases
where the showing made in support of the motion for new
trial is sufficient to indicate that the appeal may be meritorious, or at least that the points presented by the appeal are
such as to entitle the appellant to a hearing 011 the merits.
The policy of the law is always to favor, wherever possible,
a hearing of an appeal on the merits (California Nat. Bank
v. El Dorado Lime etc. 00.,200 Cal. 452 [253 P. 704] ; Waybright v. Anderson, 200 Cal. 374, [253 P. 148] ; Manning v.
Gavin, 14 Ca1.2d 44 [92 P.2d 795] ; Wood v. Peters"on Farm.~
Co., 214 Cal. 94 [3 P.2d "922] ; Banta Vo Siller, 121 Cal. 414
[53 P. 935] ; Labarthe v. McRae, 35 Cal.App.2d 734 [97 P.2d
251].) It is just as essential that an appellant be protected in
his right to have his appeal heard on the merits as that a
respondent be given the benefit of the presumptions and intendments supportinK his judgment. Morever, a retrial gives
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both parties another chance, whereas a denial of it absolutely
forecloses the appellant.
'
There can therefore be no question that section 953e has
been properly construed to repose in the trial court a wide
discretion in passing upon motions for new trial made on t~e
stated ground. But this discretion, ~lthou~h a "wide" on~, 1S
not nnlimited, arbitrary, or unrestr1cted; 1t must be exerCIsed
according to settled rules. In commenting on the danger of
investing judges with an unlimited discretion, Lord Camden,
one of the greatest and purest of the English jurists, said:
"The discretion of a judge is the law of tyrants; it is always
unknown; it is different in different men; it is casual, and
depends on constitution, temper, Iud passion. In the bes~ it
is often caprice; in the worst it is every vice, folly, and pa~lon·
to which human nature can be liable." (State v. Oumm~ngs,
36 Mo. 263, 278, 12 Words and Phrases, p. 588.)
Discretion in granting a new trial, has been defined as
"an honest attempt, in the exercise by the judge of his duty
and power to see that justice is done, to establish a legal
right" (Johnson v. Grayson, 230 Mo. 380, [130 S.W; 673,
676]) ; it means a "legal discretion to be exe~cised in ~is~ern
ing the course prescribed by the law, accordmg to prmclples
ascertained by adjudged cases. . .. Judicial power is not
exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the.
judge, but always for the purpose of giving effect to the will
of the law" (Belt v. Morris, 168 Okla. 528 [34 P.2d 581,
584] ). It is not capricious, arbitrary, wilful, vague, fanciful, but is legal and regular, directed by reason and, con~,
science. In passing upon a motion for, new trial' grounded
upon the impossibility of securing a reporter's transcript,
the court cannot be motivated by his personal in(Jlination to
see his own adjudication prevail over appellant's right to
have it tested by appeal on the merits. The exercise of the
discretion may be, and is to a very great extent, regulated
by usage, or by principles which courts have learned by experience will, when applied to the great majority of cases,
best promote the ends of justice; but it is still left to the
court to determine whether a case is exactly alike in every
color, circumstance, and feature to those upon wh,ich the
usage or principle is founded, or in which it has been applied.
(State v. T:iultz, 106 Mo. 41 [16 S.W. 940, 942]; 12 \:ords
and Phrases, pp. 588-591, 603.)
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In this state, in defining "discretion," it is said in Sharon
v. Sharon, 75 Cal. 1, 48 [16 P. 345], that" The discretion of
t?e court below is a legal discretion, to be reasonably exerclse~. 'Abuse of discretion' ... does not necessarily imply
a w~lful. abuse, or intentional wrong. In a legal sense, discretIOn IS abused whenever, in its exercise, a court exceeds
the bounds of reason,-all the circumstances before it being
considered. "
,
It is thus apparent that the peculiar facts and circum-

~tances of. e~ch individual case must be carefully considered
1~ determInIng whether discretion has been properly exerCls~d. .In the present case, after reviewing the trial court '8

r~Ing In the lIght of the applicable rules and of all of the
clrcumstance~ shown by the record, I cannot but conclude
that the demal of appellant's motion for new trial was unreasonable and constituted an abuse of discretion.
I~ initiating his appeal, appellant did all things required
of hIm by statute (Oode Oiv. Proc., secs. 953a, 953b). Oounsel (1). filed notice of appeal; (2) requested preparation of a
transcrIpt; (3) arranged to compensate the court reporter'
~nd .(4) accompanied the transcriber to the Oity Hall and
ldentlfi~d the papers which were to be included in the clerk's
transcrIpt. She then made periodic inquiries as to the progress ?f the work. Under thc circumstances, she stood to gain
nothIng by un~uly har&ssing the reporter, making formal
dema~d upon hIm, or trying to force him to transcribe by
?ecurIng .a court order or writ of mandate. No time limit
18 p:-escrIbed for the filing of a transcript (H ohnemann v.
Pactfic G. &; E. Co., 31 Oal.App.2d 692, 694 [88 P.2d 748]),
and after appellant had taken the initial steps required by
statute, the duty rested upon the reporter who acts as an
office~ of the court in the performance of his ministerial
functIOns (sec. 269, Oode Oiv. Proc.; 7 Oal.Jur. sec. 55,
p. 653; Prat: v. Browne, 135 Oal. 649, 653 [67 P. 1082]),
to ~roceed wIth the work and to secure, if necessary, protectIve orders extending his time, supported by affidavits
properly served and filed (sec. 953a).
In ~~r dealings with the reporter, appellant followed the
prevall~ng cus~om, and cannot be charged with lack of diligence In relYIng. upon t~e assurances from the reportcr's
offi~e that ~xtenslOns of tIme were being secured. The transcrIber testIfied that she had been in that work since 1930
I
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and "that this was the way all extcl1sions had becn obtained
during that time and to her knowled~c :mu in her experience she had ne~er presented an affidavit." Another transcriber in the reporter's office asked appellant's counsel from
time to time not to "press the matter" or attempt to com. such a
municate with the reporter personally, as "h e .was In
mental condition that anything might upset him." Up t?
April 1941 counsel had no definite information of the serlousne~s of the reporter's illness. Oertainly after appellant's
counsel having done all things required by statute on her
part to be done, appellant should not be penalized, for the
dereliction of the court officer.
No request or suggestion was made by respo~dent that
appellant take any action against the reporter. It IS d.oub~ful
that such action could have been successfully taken In VIew
of the work being done by the reporter on another case which
delayed his starting the transcription. There was no duty
or obligation on the part of either party to procure the orders extending time. This duty rested solely upon the reporter. It is a matter of common knowledge tha.t in smaller
counties having only one reporter, the preparatIOn of tra~
scripts is often delayed for months where the reporter 18
engaged in reporting other cases or where he has other transcripts to prepare in cases which have been previously ~~
pealed, and the practice in such cases is always ~or. the ht1gants to cooperate with the reporter and not to InSISt upon
his attempting the impossible or requiring him to do more
than his endurance will permit. Under such circumstances,
if the reporter should die or become disabled, ~nd the trial
court should hold that appellant was negligent In not applying for a writ of mandate or taking some ?ther coerc~ve
steps to force the preparation of the transcrIpt, the actIon
of the court would be clearly arbitrary and unwarranted and
would constitute an abuse of discretion.
Such is the present case, for here, as already stated, the
trial court expressly based his denial of a new trial upon the
ground that "Diligence is required at all stages of the proceeding unless waived by the opposite party. In the present
case it cannot be said that the reporter was diligent in the
preparation of the transcript, or that the plaintiff took the
proper steps to guard against the contingency which has happened, to wit, the inability of the reporter to complete the
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transcript. It does not appear that a sufficient showing has
here been made to warrant the setting aside of the judgment
and the g·ranting of a new trial. ... " (C. T. p. 31.) Thi1:\
shows clearly that the trial court erroneously char/Ted appellant with the court officer's dereliction of duty, and based
his ruling on that ground.
The question of whether discretion has been soundly exercised depends, as already stated, in each case upon the particular circumstances. All of the cases cited in the majority
opinion are clearly distinguishable from the present case
because of differences in the factual situation. In support of
the statement, "In any event it is not a valid excuse that
the reporter did not have the time, owing to the press of
other business, to prepare the transcript," the majority opinion cites three cases (O'Banion v. California C. P. Growers,
109 Cal.App. 328, 329 [292 P. 975]; Laumann v. Conner,
12 Cal.App.2d 631 [55 P.2d 1255]; Harris v. Burt, 47 Cal.
App. 480, 482 [190 P. 1058 J).
The 0 'Banion case involved an appeal from an order terminating proceedings. Due to the press of business the reporter forgot to prepare the transcript. The court said this
was no excuse, but did not say that an impossibility to get
the work out due to reporting another case would not be a
valid excuse. In the present case appellant's frequent inquiries left the reporter no chance for forgetting the matter.
The Laumann case involved the effect of the reporter's
loss of his notes. The trial court was without jurisdiction
to grant a new trial because at that time loss of notes was
not a statutory ground of new trial. This omission in section
953e has been remedied by a 1943 amendment enlarging its
scope. (Stats. 1943, ch. 1017, sec. 1.)
'rhe Harris case involved the dismissal of an appeal. The
reporter wrote appellant na"ning the amount of his fee and
stating, "If you wish me to go ahead with the work, upon
prepayment of my fees I will do so promptly." Appellant
did not reply and the reporter heard nothing until he was
informed of the making of the motion to dismiss the appeal
because of the appellant's laches in securing a transcript.
The appellant's lack of diligence was properly held to support the order of dismissal.
More in line with the situation in the present case is California Nat. Bank v. Lime etc. Co., supm, where the appellants were relieved from default under the remedial provi-
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-:of sention 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure, even
81On8
·d d
t nd
though they had mistakenly relied up?n VOl or e.rs ex e ing their time for preparation of a bIll of exceptlOns. See,
also, Lewith v. Rehmke, 217 Cal. 563 [20 P.2~ 687]. ~t ~n
early date it was recognized in this state; as 111 ?ther JurI~
dictions, that an appellant should not be deprIved of hIS
constitutional right of appeal through the fault of offil~ers
of the court (Stark v. Barnes (1852), 2 Cal. 162; L?ve v.
16 Cal .2d 650 [107 P.2d 385] ; Lovell v. DGnffin,d·51
D 81Joe,)
Cai.App.2d 322 [124 P.2d 615]). I~ Lovell v. eyoe, .ISmissal of an appeal for failure to tImely file a trans~rIpt
. d all the Baround that appellant had substantIally
the
was d enle
complied with requirements and the delay was due to
.
derelictions of officers of the lower court. See, also, Cont'tnental Bldg. d; Loan Assn. v. Mills, 44 Neb. 136 [62 N.W.
47 8-480] . Sanders v. Nightengale, 109 Neb. 667 [192 N ..W.
l.
,
200-202];
California Gulch Placer M··
'tmng C o. v. Patrwk
.'
37 Idaho 661 [218 P. 378, 379] ; Lipsey v. Crosser, 62 S.D.
160 [252 N.W. 23-25]; Brinsfield v. Mather, 166 Md. 473
.
..
[171 A. 357-359].
The five other cases mainly relied upon 111 the maJorIty
opinion are also distinguishable on the facts. In Moore v.
SpeC'ialtv Oil Tool Co., s'upra, it was contended on an appeal
on the judgment roll that a new trial should have been
granted under section 953e because of ~he death of t~e official reporter who had reported a portton of th~ tes~I.mony
given during the early part. of the trial and the 111abIhty. of
the other reporters to read his shorthand notes. A. transcrIpt
purporting to contain a full and correct. record of the pr07
ceedings, with the exception of that portlOn re~or~ed by, t~e '
deceased, was presented to the tri~l jud~e. ObJectIons to Its
certification were sustained (Specwlty Otl Tool Co. v. Ames,.
117 Cal.App. 283 [3 P.2d 977]). Th:reafter appellant m~de
his motion for new trial under sectlOn 953e. I~ apRrov111g
the denial of the motion the appellate court sal~:
In the
instant case the trial court had heard all the eVIdence. produced during the trial and upon the evidence thus presented
had arrived at a decision. It would be anomalolls, at least,
to anticipate that the court should arrive at a. different result
upon a retrial where, so far as appears, the eVIdence would be
identical with that which had theretofore been presented.
Under the circumstances disclosed by the record we are of the
U
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OpInIOn that no abuse of discretion was committed by the
trial court in denying appellant's motion for new trial."
In Gonlin v. Goyne, supra, as in the Moore case, there was
a partial transcript. The reporter died, the file was destroyed,
but 655 folios of evidence were &vailable. In affirming the
order denying a new trial under section 953e, the appellate
court said: "No effort appears to have been maJe to prepare
a record by bilI of exceptions prior to the application for a
new trial. The trial judge evidently was of the opinion that
such a bill of exceptions could be formulated. Opposing counsel were not shown to be lllwilling to lend their assistance to
the court in the matter. The trial judge was there to aid in
the settlement of a sufficient and proper bill of exceptions
and that is an ancient and approved method of presenting a
record on appeal. Counsel merely a:'1sumed that it could not
be done, but aside from the expressions of their belief in the
matter, they made no showing that it was impossible or impracticable to do it. As a general rule, and quite contrary to
the views of counsel who made the motion, it is quite unnecessary to have all of the testimony incorporated in a record
on appeal. If it was necessary in this case the affidavits did
not show the necessity. There can be no doubt whatever that
inability to obtain a transcript of the trial proceedings would
in some cases present an insurmountable obstacle to the preparation of a proper record, but a very wide discretion must
be accorded the trial judge in determining what can and what
cannot be done in this respect where a complete transcript
is not available .... The ruling of this court must be that no
abuse of discretion appears to have been committed in denying the motion for a new trial under section 953e."
In /{roeker v. Jack, supra, the opinion does not detail the
facts upon which the exercise of discretion was based but it
indicates that the situation was similar to that in Gonlin v.
Coyne, supra.
Smith v. Orange Belt Supply Go., also presents a situation
where a partial transcript was available, and "It might well
be that the 66 folios of testimony which had been transcribed
contained evidence sufficient to support the judgment, in
which event the untranscribed testimony could only raise a
conflict. Nothing is said in the affidavit concerning the nature'
of the testimony which had been transcribed, and there is no
attempt to show that the evidellce was in fact insufficient to

. j
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.
While the affidavit alleges that t?C
support the Judgment. , t"
ot available' for any asSlSformer counsel for appellan IS nd t'h showing that no such
. h
ation of a recor
e
h d b timely effort is not too
tance m t e prepar
Y
assistance could have been a
strong. "
was presented to t h"IS COUrt ,
Lastly, Gomey v. Gomey, sUP'~~otion to dismiss or affirm"
under a procedure kno,;n as
a eals which were clearly
formerly employed to d~sPfose. o~ nP~ates no more than, that
non-meritorious. The brl~ op:mo
buse of dlscretlOn.
facts and circumstances enthere was no a
. 1
The present record dISC oses
Here the trial
f
those of the above cases.
tirely differ~nt rom Th reporter, under pressure of app~lconsumed nme ~ays.., e,
ed several cylinders, He dId
lant's frequent mqmrleS, ~Ict;!n Francisco another reporter
this while, as is cu.:toma~y mff h'ft from th~ case he was rer ' d rmgddition
hIS 0 -s I
I
was ,re Ievmg 1u,
to the clerk's transcript, appeportlllg, In al , III ~
the transcriber only about 188 pages
lant was able to get ~om
bout two and one-half days of
of reporter 's transcrIp~, or a
ffi' t to permit of com, d trial ThIS was not su Clen
. d
the mne ay
, ,
f this type involving as It oes
pletion of a record III ~ case? the natu~e of an accounting,
"
be of separate Items III
anum ,r, '"
' rr h 1£ a dozen separate cases,
,
so that It IS lIke trylll", ~
t of the motion for new
The affidavit of counsel III sUPPto,r
to be determined on
that "The legal ques Ions
, 1
II
trial a eges
th facts established at the trIa,
appeal depend wholly upon t:at the reporter's transcript of
and it, is theref~r;, n~~~S::~he legal questions referred to. is
the trIal be ha ,
' b ' f to be whether the trIal
stated in appellant's o1?edmn g t' rle 2344 of the Civil Code,
eously apphe sec IOn

~~~~~;:~~ the obligati~ ~f :l;goe::tj::;::~e;or~~~:7t:

to the facts of the case, a ur
. eUate court would be
'th ut presentation of the facts, an app
'1
r d
WI 0
'hether the statute was proper y app Ie .
unable to ~et~rmlll~ "! n states that "In the absence of a recThe maJorIty OpIm? 2344 f the Civil Code was involved
0
• •
• t
d h wing that sectIOn
,
f that section IS lllapproprla e.
or s o ,
on the trial any dISCUSSIon ~ ,
171 Cal 135 137 [152
(See Town of St, Helena v, .errtam,
' d it'is difficult
P 299] )" But the cited case IS not helpful, an
't
uld
.'
11 t 1 k' g a reporter's transcrlp , co
to see how appe an, ~c l,n that section 2344 is involved

r~:e~asan:ee:tr~::\; ~:elll:resentation

of the point in the

!
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opening brief and the submission of a full clerk '8 tran.
script. All of the indications are that the statute is involved,
rather than the contrary.
The majority opinion also states that "There was no showing made as to the nature of the testimony, and no indication
that there was any merit in an appeaL" This is contrary to
the record. The pleadings show the nature of the case and
the issues joined for trial. The clerk's transcript also shows
that the trial court, as already stated, first gave defendants
judgment on their cross-complaint for $39,267.31, but on denial of plaintiff's original motion for new trial, disallowed a
$15,000 item. The very fact that the trial judge once changed
his mind as to a substantial item, comprising more than onethird of the judgment, indicates that the case may have been
a close one and that the points raised by the appeal, if not
meritorious, are at least of sufficient substantiality to merit
consideration.
In a memorandum upon denial of the original motion for
new trial the trial judge stated that he was considering the
"same primary question" as was presented on the trial, and
as to that would not change his ruling, but that as to the
item of $15,000, it appeared to be "in the nature of damage
for a breach of contract and should not be allowed." The
findings, conclusions, and judgment were modified accordingly. This ruling left the case in a state which was not satisfactory to either party, so that both plaintiff and defendant
took separate appeals. This shows plainly that the trial
court's adjudication was by no means so conclusively correct
that the denial of a new trial under the conditions mentioned
could be classed as a sound or reasonable exercise of discretion.
The denial of relief cannot be upheld upon any claim of
injury to respondents. Respondents also appealed from the
judgment. The duty to procure a transcript rested upon them
just as much as it did upon appellant, and the same avenues of
relief open to appellant were open to them. They might have
taken steps to compel the reporter to act, or if they found the
delay unreasonable, they could have Bought an order terminating proceedings for preparation of the transcript. They
did nothing, however, until appellant moved for a new trial
under section 953e. They then noticed their own motion to
terminate proceedings and opposed appellant's motion on the
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and extra expense involved
d f delay inconvemence,
.
f
groun
0
,
d
th
t
on a retrial, and the haz~r. a the personal recollectIOns 0
'ng for a new trial, canwitnesses might be less dIstm:t.
ar~~ compel the reporter to
They urge that appella:r:t ,
not take advantage of .t~elr fal :ey in any position to oppose
act. This is so. But nelt er ar: t the have been damaged by
the new trial on the gro~nd ~ ~n th?t delay. The law favors
the dela!, fo: .they aC:Ule::~s (Clemmens v. Olemmens, 13
early dISposItIOn of app
h
both parties appeal,
Cal 2d 651 [G7 P .2d 529]), but were . t and the appeal
.
.
b t1 to procure a transcrlp ,
h
nt of prosecutioll where
the duty IS upon 0 1
will not be ~ismissed for lact e: ~: :;vantage of the other to
. v Duane 86 Cal. 149
both are gUllty. One canno .. a
, 272 )
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2 H ne on New Trial, p. 1512, sec.
.
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[24 P. 867] ;
Therefore, inasmnch as t e re:~r. ossible for appellant to
incapacity of the reporter ~atdet~a;~~ere was no lack of dilisecure an adequate tran~~rIP , eal presents substantial points
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stituted an abuse of dIscretIO~. ThIS liberalg in upholding the
with the trend of the .1aWt~O ~:eo~:nial of one (39 Am.Jur.
granting of a new ~rI~!o w~:h the legislative intent to .liberal.
sec. 202, supra)! a~ ~
btainin in this state, as eVIdenced
g.
that statute to em.
ize the former lImItatIOns 0
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brace not only SItuatIOns c
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of the reporter, but those crea e
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t " of hIS no es . .
in whole or in su~stantIa p~ri~l and termina~irig proceedings
The order denymg a new r
h ld be remanded for a
should be reversed and the cause s o u .
.
new trial.
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Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
was denied
January
Appellant's petition for a ;e hea~ing
SchaU:er
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for a
24, 1944. Shenk, J., Carter, ., an
, ,
rehearing.

